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On the evening of Friday, August 28, 1964, Philadelphia succumbed to the wave of urban riots that had been sweeping cities along the East Coast during a long and 
hot summer.1 Violence broke out at the corner of 22nd Street and 
Columbia Avenue in North Philadelphia after a black couple, 
Rush and Odessa Bradford, was confronted by two Philadelphia 
police officers, Patrolmen John Hoff and Robert Wells. Hoff, who 
was white, and Wells, who was black, had been called to the scene 
because the couple, allegedly engaged in a domestic dispute in their 
car, was blocking the flow of traffic at the busy intersection.2 Upon 
reaching the corner, the officers found Odessa Bradford holding her 
foot on the car’s brake pedal. She proceeded to argue with Officer 
Wells, who pulled her out of the car by her wrists. Her removal 
should have been the end of the relatively minor disturbance, but 
as she was being put into the police wagon, a bystander emerged 
from the crowd and punched Hoff, causing passersby to enter 
the fray. After arresting Bradford and the bystander, who had 
punched his partner, Wells returned to the scene of the Bradfords’ 
dispute to find a storm of flying bottles and bricks being aimed at 
police and their wagons. The ensuing violence and looting lasted 
the remainder of the weekend as rumors spread throughout the 
neighborhood that a black woman had been beaten and killed by a 
white police officer. Despite the rumors being untrue, they stirred 
greater anger toward police. When the violence finally ended, two 
were dead, 350 were wounded, and commercial establishments 
lining the Columbia Avenue thoroughfare suffered approximately 
$4 million of damage.3 
 Home to the highest unemployment rates in the city, poorest 
housing, and lowest income and educational levels, North 
Philadelphia was more than simply an early example of the 
explosiveness of the urban crisis within the existing narrative of the 
1960s.4 Commonly referred to as “the Jungle,” the predominantly 
African-American neighborhood was the site of 19 percent of 
the city’s crime and only 9 percent of its population. The phrase 
“the Jungle” was used by “many policemen, . . . much of the 
white community, [and] even . . . some juveniles who live in the 
area,” according to the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin. Such usage 
signaled that in addition to being “a catalogue of social failure,”5 
as the Bulletin reported, North Philadelphia also was discursively 
constructed in highly racialized, and racist, terms. The lexicon of 
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descriptors conjured by a phrase such as “the Jungle” allowed for 
the demonization of the neighborhood and those who lived there. 
This casting of the neighborhood, set within the context of frequent 
charges of police brutality by community members, made North 
Philadelphia no stranger to strained relations with the Philadelphia 
Police Department.6 Urban League Executive Director Andrew 
Freeman dubbed North Philadelphia “a racial tinderbox” in early 
August 1964, waiting for a spark to ignite it.7 Only weeks later, the 
Bradfords’ chance altercation provided the spark. 
Riots such as those which broke out in Philadelphia in 1964, in Watts in Los Angeles one year later, and in Newark and Detroit in 1967 have been cited by historians as the catalysts 
compelling federal attention to longstanding issues of racism and 
inequality and resulting in President Lyndon Johnson forming 
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner 
Commission) in 1967. In its report a year later, the commission 
devoted particular attention to two institutions: the police and the 
news media, both of which were deemed to play formative roles 
in “deepening the bitter residue of fear . . . threatening the future 
of all Americans.”8 Although not among the cities investigated by 
the Kerner Commission, Philadelphia, as one of the earliest U.S. 
cities to fall victim to violence in the 1960s, contributed to the 
climate of turmoil simmering within the cities, which, by the end 
of the decade, culminated in riots elsewhere even more devastating 
in scale than its own.   
This study positions journalists within the existing narrative of 
the 1960s as historical agents, who shaped discourses surrounding 
race, policing, and urban violence with unintended results. Through 
a textual analysis of newspaper coverage of the 1964 Philadelphia 
riot and historical manuscripts, this study contends that journalists 
helped shape Philadelphia’s future course, specifically regarding to 
whom its police would be beholden. As interpreters of the violence 
that broke out on Columbia Avenue in 1964, journalists urged 
readers to understand the riot in a particular way: as a war touched 
off by deviant “hoodlums” whose blatant disregard for law and 
order was in some ways enabled by an unprepared Philadelphia 
Police Department. It is argued that the two dominant frames—
marginalization and police paralysis— embedded in the sources 
examined interacted to provide the discursive fodder for opponents 
of Philadelphia’s Police Advisory Board in an effort to dismantle 
the body. 
A Columbia Avenue storefront in Philadelphia shows the result of a 1964 riot.
(Used with the permission of the Special Collections Research Center, Temple University Libraries, Philadelphia, Pa.) 
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Through an examination of the nuances of news coverage 
uniting, and in some instance differentiating, Philadelphia’s 
three dailies—the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, the Philadelphia 
Inquirer, and the Philadelphia Daily News—as well as a black 
newspaper, the two-day-a-week Philadelphia Tribune, this study 
suggests that deeper insight can be gained into the stakes involved 
in coverage of the 1964 Columbia Avenue riot. In privileging 
the frames of marginalization and police paralysis, journalists 
opened up discursive possibilities even they had not envisioned, 
providing a language that could be co-opted by political interests. 
Thus, this case is one of unintended consequences: journalistic 
frames were used to contribute to the 
fortification of a conservative coalition 
being strengthened by a burgeoning 
sense among whites in urban areas that 
their security was threatened.9 Although 
the circulation of these two frames alone 
cannot explain the eventual demise of 
Philadelphia’s Police Advisory Board, this 
study argues that the image of the police 
officer standing idly by while young black 
“hoodlums” roamed the streets proved 
invaluable ammunition for opponents of 
the board, who found in news coverage 
further evidence of liberalism’s failure to 
protect the populace. 
When the Police Advisory Board was 
founded in 1958 under the auspices of 
liberal Democratic Mayor Richardson 
Dilworth, it was supposed to play a vital 
role in the rehabilitation of Philadelphia’s 
ailing police department, which was 
beset by corruption and allegations of 
police brutality. With the ousting of the 
Republican machine in 1952, which 
had ruled the city for more than sixty 
years, Philadelphia became a city run by Cold War liberals who 
sought to dissociate the mayor’s office from the police department, 
historic bedfellows. Part of the liberals’ plan was to act upon 
the recommendations of organizations such as the Philadelphia 
Fellowship Commission, which sought to fight discrimination 
and systemic injustices in schools, the workplace, and the media, 
among other sites, and to create an infrastructure which would 
enable Philadelphia to fulfill its latent potential.10   
Responding to organizations such as the Americans for 
Democratic Action, the ACLU, and the NAACP, Dilworth 
intended for the board to listen to testimony from citizen 
complainants and accused policemen, making recommendations 
to the mayor ranging from discharge from the department to 
dismissal of the complaint. The board was a direct response to 
those, like a city councilman, who believed police were pursuing 
“terror tactics” throughout the city.11 The intent of the board was 
that citizens could trust that their complaints would be heard by 
the Police Advisory Board without having to worry that they would 
be blindly dismissed. Unlike the department’s internal board of 
inquiry, which was often charged with “whitewash” and “collusion 
between brother officers,”12 the Police Advisory Board would be 
different. The mayor saw it as having particular potential in North 
Philadelphia, where relationships between the predominantly 
black neighborhood and the predominantly white police force 
were especially tense. The board, for the mayor and the board’s 
advocates, signaled hope for Philadelphia’s future.
Slightly over a year after the riot had ended in Philadelphia, 
George Herold, the chairman of the Commission on Christian 
Social Concerns, sent a letter to Philadelphia Mayor James Tate in 
which he warned, “Philadelphia is one of two major United States 
cities with a civilian review board. Properly, the nation watches what 
happens here.”13 Although the debates surrounding the necessity of 
the Police Advisory Board had a direct impact on Philadelphia, 
other cities, such as New York, were looking to Philadelphia’s 
unfolding story as they debated the merits of their own police review 
boards.14 However, by 1969, with the dissolution of Philadelphia’s 
Police Advisory Board, another symbolic 
nail was driven into the coffin of postwar 
liberalism. The discourse of fear, bolstered 
by journalistic frames of marginalization 
and police paralysis that were used to 
cover Philadelphia’s 1964 riot, prevailed 
as the racial tensions that had provided 
much of the initial impetus for the board 
continued to divide the city, much like 
its postindustrial counterparts.
The selection of the newspapers included in this analysis was rooted in an effort to explore 
the range of audiences to whom 
Philadelphia’s journalists spoke. The 
Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, the city’s 
newspaper of record, was a family-owned 
paper started in 1847, whose slogan 
famously read, “Nearly Everybody Reads 
the Bulletin.”15 One of the ten largest 
newspapers in the United States in 
1960, it was the largest afternoon paper 
in the English-speaking world. Run by 
the McLean family, which was known 
to have made clear to its staff its belief that good journalism was 
thorough, unsensational journalism,16 the Bulletin was known for 
its superior local reporting in multiple daily editions.
Unlike the Bulletin, which had a reputation in the city as a 
paper of repute, the Philadelphia Inquirer had been taken over by 
Walter Annenberg upon his father’s death in 1942 and was known 
as the mouthpiece of its publisher from the 1950s until he sold the 
newspaper in 1969. Historically the Inquirer tended toward the right 
of the political spectrum although it deemed itself an “independent 
newspaper,”17 supporting Democratic candidates in the early 1950s. 
Despite its self-proclaimed independence, the paper’s involvement in 
a variety of scandals during the first decades of Walter Annenberg’s 
tenure as publisher damaged its reputation as a legitimate purveyor of 
news. When asked about Annenberg’s influence, Bulletin journalist 
Peter Binzen said in 1979, “I thought Annenburg [sic] was the most 
reckless, irresponsible publisher in the United States when he was 
going full-speed ahead here.”18 Although Binzen was a journalist 
employed by the Inquirer’s most serious competitor, he was not 
alone in his critique of the way that the Inquirer was run.19 Over the 
course of the 1960s, Annenberg made a friend in policeman-turned 
Commissioner Frank Rizzo, a tough cop and a staunch law and 
order advocate. This relationship shaped the tenor of the Inquirer’s 
coverage, particularly coverage pertaining to the Philadelphia Police 
Department, throughout the 1960s. Although the Bulletin’s weekly 
circulation exceeded the Inquirer’s, the latter consistently dominated 
“Slightly over a year after the 
riot had ended in Philadelphia, 
George Herold, the chairman 
of the Commission on Christian 
Social Concerns, sent a letter to 
Philadelphia Mayor
James Tate in which he warned, 
‘Philadelphia is one of two 
major United States cities 
with a civilian review board. 
Properly, the nation watches 
what happens here.’”
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the Bulletin’s Sunday edition.20 
The city’s most prominent tabloid, the Philadelphia Daily 
News, was purchased in 1957 by Walter Annenberg, who made 
it an afternoon publication. Despite the Inquirer’s and the Daily 
News’ shared publisher throughout the 1960s, the newspapers 
did not consistently share an editorial stance because Annenberg’s 
attention was devoted predominantly to the Inquirer. Known as 
the “people paper,” whose circulation rested on street sales rather 
than subscriptions, the Daily News embodied a form of personal 
journalism largely absent from the Bulletin and Inquirer. Unlike 
its counterparts, the Daily News was a highly visual newspaper, 
often printing page-long photographic 
montages. 
The Philadelphia Tribune, known 
as “the constructive newspaper” and 
later dubbed “the voice of the black 
community,” was founded in 1884 by 
Christopher J. Perry and is the oldest 
continually published African-American 
newspaper in the United States. Founded 
as an advocate for the black community, 
the Tribune not only covered “hard 
news” in the traditional sense but also 
community and social events. As V.P. 
Franklin argued in 1984, the Tribune 
served not only as a lens through 
which to view the changing contours of 
Philadelphia’s growing African-American 
population but as an “educational 
agency” that enhanced solidarity.21 The 
newspaper was published on Tuesdays 
and Fridays throughout the 1960s.22 
To examine how these four 
newspapers framed the story of the 
1964 Columbia Avenue riot, this study 
drew upon news articles, photographs, 
editorials, letters to the editor, and 
commentaries during the two weeks 
following the riot’s outbreak on August 
28.23 In order to assess the ways in which 
the papers’ coverage was deployed in 
discourse surrounding the viability 
of Philadelphia’s Police Advisory Board, this study additionally 
examined various pieces of correspondence, press releases, and 
pamphlets relating to debates regarding the board, from its 
inception in 1958 through its eventual demise in 1969.
News of the outbreak of violence on Columbia Avenue first ran on August 29 in the Inquirer and was followed by the afternoon editions of the Daily News and the Bulletin. 
Due to the timing of the event, the first Tribune coverage of the 
riot did not appear until September 1 after the violence had ended. 
Each newspaper devoted considerable column space to covering 
and commenting on the violence. The sheer quantity of coverage 
suggested the story’s significance, but patterns quickly emerged in 
the quality of coverage as journalists encouraged readers to interpret 
the riot in a particular way: a violent outburst begun by deviant 
“hoodlums” whose disregard for law and order was largely enabled 
by an unprepared Philadelphia Police Department. The two 
dominant frames emerging from this reading—marginalization 
and police paralysis—were present in all of the papers but were 
utilized in different ways by them. Despite their collective 
agreement that the rioters were young “vandals” who were not part 
of the black mainstream, the papers diverged about whether the 
relatively laissez-faire police department had abdicated its role by 
not enforcing order more assertively.  
Those participating in North Philadelphia’s weekend riot, 
according to local newspapers, were characterized not only as 
“rioters” but “looters,” “hoodlums,” “vandals,” and even “urchins,” 
a term used only by the Philadelphia Tribune. Taken together, 
these descriptors contributed to news organizations’ frame of 
marginalization, which was reinforced by repeated dissociation 
of the rioters with the civil rights 
movement. As Police Commissioner 
Howard Leary stated in an interview, the 
“hoodlums” who led the violence were 
not the “responsible members of the 
Negro community,”24 who had welcomed 
his men into the North Philadelphia 
neighborhood as they attempted to restore 
order. Described as “out of control,” “a 
shouting, laughing mob,” and “howling,” 
the rioters’ behavior was not only deemed 
disrespectful and lacking in control 
but indicative of their youth; all three 
dailies described the rioters as between 
their teens and thirties.25 A September 
1 Tribune headline further advanced the 
dailies’ claim: “Youths ‘Sorry’ for Defacing 
Tan Business: New Shoes From Looted 
Stores Are First for Urchin.”26 Although 
the tone of the Tribune’s headline was 
less disdainful than the city’s dailies, in 
choosing to reinforce the poverty of the 
neighborhood’s residents, the Tribune, 
like the dailies, contributed to the general 
sense that the rioters were simply young 
people who were not to be taken seriously.
By positioning the rioters as young 
people “acting out,” news organizations 
argued implicitly that these young 
men and women were not exercising 
legitimate grievance. Only the Tribune 
unsurprisingly attempted to subtly convey an alternative reading 
of the rioters, referring to them once as “soldiers.”27 This analogy 
granted them a degree of legitimacy absent in the dailies. As a part 
of a collective devoted to fighting for a cause, a soldier is one behind 
whom support is rallied. Thus, the use of the term suggested a 
degree of solidarity with the rioters, juxtaposing the imagery of 
dispersed “hoodlums” ravaging the streets, which appeared more 
consistently in news reports. The use of the term “urchin” had a 
similar effect, conjuring up images of helpless children. Although 
the reference to “urchins” did not afford the rioters a cause implied 
by the term “soldiers,” “urchin” suggested that the rioters could 
not be held responsible for their actions because they were only 
children. Instead of instigators, they were victims of a political 
system that had contributed to their community’s poverty. 
The Tribune, however, was careful not to grant the rioters too 
much legitimacy. Articulating solidarity with the rioters would 
have simultaneously undermined local black leaders who vocally 
denounced the riot. One such leader, the Rev. Leon H. Sullivan, 
distanced the rioters from the local black community, stating: 
“The rioters participating
in North Philadelphia’s 
weekend riot, according to local 
newspapers, were characterized 
not only as ‘rioters’ but 
‘looters,’ ‘hoodlums,’ ‘vandals,’ 
and even ‘urchins,’ a term 
used only by the Philadelphia 
Tribune. Taken together, these 
descriptors contributed
to news organizations’ frame 
of marginalization, which 
was reinforced by repeated 
dissociation of the rioters with 
the civil rights movement.”
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“The vast majority of the Negroes disapprove of the actions of a 
comparatively few hoodlums.”28 His decision to position the rioters 
as unrepresentative of the broader community, which was echoed 
by other black leaders, signaled recognition of the riot’s potential 
to undermine the efforts of civil rights leaders. For this reason, 
the Tribune was in the tenuous position of having to toe the line 
between the black community at large and the leaders in it. 
The delicate space occupied by the Tribune was further 
evidenced in the tension between the paper’s front-page headline 
on September 1—“Respect for Law and Order Philadelphia’s Only 
Salvation”—and its page five commentary—“Rioters, Hoodlums 
Are What They Are Because America Made Them That Way.” 
Thus, the paper lauded police on page one for not acting more 
assertively and denounced those who disrupted the peace, and 
then the page five commentary emphasized the neighborhood’s 
structural problems, pointing to the daily injustices confronted 
by community members. The paper’s focus on infrastructural 
problems plaguing North Philadelphia demonstrated an acute 
awareness of the African-American audience, which was comprised 
of not only participants in the riot but also more established 
civil rights activists. Although the Tribune’s systemic focus in its 
commentary signaled a departure from news coverage, it defaulted 
to its characterization of the rioters as “hoodlums,” which was in 
accord with the local black leaders, who deemed the riot “Not Civil 
Rights.”29 In defining the riot as against the civil rights movement, 
a strategy which was used by all four newspapers, and the rioters, 
by extension, drunken gangs of rowdy teens, race was removed 
from newspaper discourse as a factor leading to the violence. This, 
however, is not to say race was not part of the discourse on the 
street.30 The frame of marginalization positioned the rioters as 
fearsome youths who fit the pre-existing racialized “Jungle” motif.
Linked to the frame of marginalization was police paralysis, 
which was evident in the first Inquirer report of the riot: “A squad 
of nearly 100 policemen watched helplessly at 36th and Columbia 
as scores of young men and women smashed a window, denuded 
the display in seconds, then rushed inside to pillage and plunder.”31 
The description of a helpless police department passively watching 
rather than acting authoritatively was visible in a Bulletin headline 
Philadelphia brought in large numbers of police officers, who were criticized for being too passive, for the 1964 riot.
(Used with the permission of the Special Collections Research Center, Temple University Libraries, Philadelphia, Pa.)
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later that day: “Police Stand By.” One day later, on August 30, the 
Bulletin reiterated police inaction, announcing, “Daylight Gangs 
Loot Stores as Police Watch.”32 
Although the Daily News’ language was not as explicit as either 
the Inquirer’s or the Bulletin’s in casting the department as passive, 
the paper’s front page headline on August 29, “33 Policemen 
Injured Battling Looting Gangs,” suggested a similar inability of 
the police to effectively complete their tasks.33 Despite the Daily 
News’ use of the term “battling,” which suggested greater activity 
and effort on the part of police, the headline ultimately aligned 
the newspaper with its daily counterparts by pointing to the 
victimization of officers. Police injuries 
sustained at the hands of “looting gangs” 
served as the focal point of Daily News 
headlines rather than the success of 
police in attempting to quell the riot. 
Police officers were portrayed as victims 
rather than keepers of the peace, fighting 
a losing battle. 
Resembling the Daily News’ indirect 
approach to addressing the nature of 
police action, the Tribune’s lead headline 
on September 1 made no reference to 
police, which was a pattern that persisted 
throughout the paper’s headlines. Its lead 
headline read: “Trib Photog Gives Blow-
by-Blow Account of Columbia Ave. 
Rioting: Sees Looters Strike Stores Like 
Soldiers.”34 Providing a detailed narrative 
of the violence, the Tribune article also 
offered insight into the rioters, describing 
a photojournalist’s exchange with a young man who offered to 
break a store window so the journalist could “get a good shot.” 
The photographer’s interaction reminded readers that journalists, 
and in particular the African-American journalists at the Tribune, 
were engaged with the rioters in ways that the predominantly white 
police officers were not. 
The Tribune’s photographs that did depict officers captured 
the fragility of the newspaper’s place within the landscape; like 
the dailies, the Tribune showed few images of police officers in 
active positions. One photograph, “Irate Police Club Suspect into 
Submission,” marked a stark departure from the visual tableaux. 
Depicting an officer with his nightstick poised to strike blows on 
a rioter being held on the ground, the photograph displayed an 
aggressive, perhaps even abusive, police force. According to the 
caption, the picture encapsulated why “residents of [the] area 
are not in love with law enforcement agencies.”35 Police action 
and assertiveness, according to the Tribune, were not necessarily 
good for police-community relations because they were one of 
the reasons that residents of North Philadelphia were wary of 
police, leading local NAACP leader Cecil B. Moore to attribute 
the violence on Columbia Avenue to “a long history of police 
mistreatment.”36
Except for this anomalous photograph of police action, 
photographs of police across the city’s newspapers told the same 
visual story: a police department that did little to intervene as the 
violence grew more intense. The three photographs on the front 
page of the Inquirer two days earlier captured the newspapers’ 
collective framing of police intervention during the riot. The 
largest photograph was captioned: “Storekeeper retrieved register 
from sidewalk outside shop wrecked during night of rioting and 
looting in North Philadelphia Negro section.” Two equally sized 
photographs under it were captioned: “Police keep passersby 
moving in riot area, but plundering continued during Friday night 
and was resumed after darkness fell Saturday night” and “Police 
crouch behind car for cover as they are fired on by rioters during 
second night of violence. Officers returned fire.”37 The largest 
photograph presented the damage in the neighborhood, where 
residents and storeowners picked up the pieces of their homes and 
shops in the wake of violence. While the two smaller photographs 
displayed police efforts to actively stop the riot, they depicted a 
police department that could do little to stop the “plundering.” 
Thus, they reinforced the sense that if 
police were on the scene, they did little 
to help. If officers were not pictured 
hiding behind cars for cover, they 
were in formation or more informally 
surrounded by fellow officers.  Such 
images only reinforced the messages of 
the papers’ headlines and news articles of 
talk but no action.
While the newspapers empha-sized the department’s generally passive approach 
to policing the riot in headlines 
and photographs, the frames of 
marginalization and police paralysis were 
given further credence by public officials, 
community activists, and police officers 
who, journalists reported, cited the 
police department’s lack of control over 
the unfolding violence in North Philadelphia. But despite their 
agreement on the rioters’ marginal status and the department’s 
hands-off approach to handling them, these sources differed in 
their evaluation of police passivity. Some lauded the hands-off 
approach as a strategic move to mitigate the potential for violence 
while others deemed it a lapse in police judgment. 
In addition to Police Commissioner Leary, who praised his 
department for its restraint, Mayor Tate remained one of the 
most vocal supporters of police activity during the riot. Quoted 
by the Philadelphia Inquirer as saying that had police used guns 
instead of nightsticks, the riot would have been a “bloodbath,” he 
proclaimed: “We weathered the storm and returned to normalcy 
without having to resort to horses, firehoses or firearms. And this 
is an achievement of which all Philadelphians can be proud.”38 
His commentary, referencing the recent tactics employed by 
Birmingham, Alabama, Police Chief Bull Connor, revealed the 
mayor’s attempt to differentiate Philadelphia from other cities 
which had sustained similar uprisings. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
was not Philadelphia, Mississippi.39 
Tate’s praise of police restraint was not universally shared. 
Opposition emerged most vocally from two camps: the NAACP 
and the Philadelphia City Council. Despite overlapping critiques, 
the roots of their resistance lay in fundamentally different concerns. 
Speaking on behalf of the NAACP, Roy Wilkins articulated concern 
that Philadelphia’s riot, like other urban riots in the North, was 
part of a larger national conspiracy that the National Guard should 
have been called in to address. His call for the National Guard, 
although not an explicit critique of police action, suggested that 
Philadelphia’s police could not do the job. City Council President 
Paul D’Ortona agreed with Wilkins’ appeal for greater police 
“Except for [an] anomalous 
photograph of police action 
[in the Philadelphia Tribune], 
photographs of police across the 
city’s newspapers told the same 
visual story:
a police department that 
did little to intervene as the 
violence grew more intense.”
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presence, arguing that Philadelphia needed to hire additional 
policemen to control the “hoodlums.” Where he diverged from 
Wilkins was in his more forceful claim for the entrenchment of 
law that people should fear. According to the Inquirer, the city 
council president claimed, “[T]he enemies of the decent people of 
this city must know and fear the power of the law.”40 While news 
organizations largely focused on the apparent disregard for the law 
by the rioters and the inability of the police department to restore 
order, D’Ortona’s claim that the law was something people needed 
to fear rather than simply to respect marked a crucial shift in the 
way “law and order” was conceived.
Journalists failed to overtly adopt 
D’Ortona’s tone in pushing for more 
aggressiveness by the police, yet news 
reports quoting disgruntled police 
officers implicitly agreed with him. 
One Philadelphia highway patrolman 
claimed, according to the Inquirer, “We 
try to defend citizens and their property 
and even our own men, yet we have 
nothing to help ourselves. We were 
told not to interfere with the rioting or 
the looting. We saw people looting the 
stores and we didn’t stop them.”41 The 
Inquirer similarly reported Deputy Police 
Commissioner Frank Rizzo’s command 
to his men not to “make a move if you’re 
outnumbered.  Let them break the 
windows.”42 Such statements advanced 
the dominant critique that police officers 
remained virtually powerless to combat 
violence and looting, presenting not only 
orders from such high-ranking officials 
as Rizzo but frustrations from below. 
Officers claimed they were paralyzed, 
constrained by the department’s chain of 
command.
The stories of local merchants 
furthered the image of an undermanned 
department unable to answer the calls of 
those victimized by the riot. The Inquirer 
chronicled the stories of two local merchants: Samuel Fox, a shoe 
storeowner, and Samuel Nerenblatt, a dry goods storeowner. Fox 
complained, “I asked for protection and I was told not to worry. 
The police seemed like they didn’t want to make trouble—so 
they just stood there.” A disgruntled Nerenblatt relayed a similar 
experience with police after being told, “That’s tough” in response 
to the his call to report the looting of his store. He said, “Isn’t there 
any law left? If I get stopped for speeding, can I tell the policeman 
‘Forget it’?”43
While the Inquirer and Bulletin cited several examples of police 
officers claiming their hands were tied by the departmental chain 
of command, Police Commissioner Leary denied accusations 
that he ordered police officers not to use their guns. Seeking to 
set the record straight, he stated, “The Philadelphia police force 
does not use violent methods except when required to avoid 
imminent injury or death to either police officers or civilians.”44 
His comment, attempting to portray his department as defensive 
rather than offensive, only reinforced arguments that police 
officers were kept from using their guns, although this was not 
the case. 
Compounding the effects of news coverage indicating a passive and ineffectual police force, the editorial boards of the four newspapers weighed in on the appropriateness of 
police work during the riot. Each acknowledged that police could 
have done more to actively stop the violence and looting, and they 
agreed that firing on looters could have touched off, in the words 
of the Inquirer, “a holocaust of death.” Where they disagreed, like 
their sources, was whether more police would have been a good 
thing. For the Inquirer and the Bulletin, emphasis was placed, as 
the Inquirer noted, on the “breakdown of law and order” in a city 
where “young thugs have become accustomed to controlling the 
streets in their neighborhoods.”45 The 
Daily News was more ambivalent, hailing 
police for their work during the riot but 
raising the question as to whether more 
police were necessary. The Tribune, in 
contrast, maintained its support for 
the police department and its leaders, 
crediting them with restoring order to 
a neighborhood that had dissolved into 
chaos.  
The division between the Inquirer 
and the Bulletin, on the one hand, and the 
Daily News and the Tribune, on the other, 
was placed into stark relief immediately 
following the riot’s outbreak as the 
papers editorialized on the violence. The 
Inquirer’s August 30 editorial, “In North 
Philadelphia: A Tragedy,” reflected upon 
violence which, the paper noted, no 
one, black or white, wanted. Within 
days, however, the Inquirer’s tone was 
less somber. The “shattered” pride of the 
City of Brotherly Love that “must be 
built again”46 on August 30 was deemed 
a consequence of the “Deplorable and 
Disgraceful” state of the city a day later. 
The Inquirer pointedly stated, “The plain 
unhappy fact is that police cannot even 
exercise routine day-by-day control over 
street gangs in this city. How, then, are 
riots to be quelled?” Noting that “many police not only conducted 
themselves admirably and heroically in this crisis,” the paper 
claimed police “showed a coolness of judgment under fire that was 
instrumental in preventing a terrible tragedy from becoming much 
worse.” Its conclusion was nonetheless severe: “Police protection 
has declined dangerously in this city—a truth which this newspaper 
and numerous responsible citizens have been saying.” Thus, the 
paper’s challenge to the city was considerably more confrontational 
than its lament a day earlier. Although this editorial made no 
explicit reference to the Police Advisory Board, claims about the 
city’s “decline in police protection,” 47 which was represented by the 
paper and its counterparts in photographs and written text, would 
resurface in debates surrounding the board’s viability. 
The tone of the Inquirer’s commentary grew stronger over the 
next several days. Following its declaration of the laxity of police 
protection, the editorial board clarified its critique of a city that was 
unprepared: “Beyond any question, the riots in North Philadelphia 
have demonstrated an urgent and critical need for better protection 
of the law-abiding citizens of this city against hoodlums.” Charging 
police with not “safeguard[ing] property,” the Inquirer continued, 
“Compounding the effects
of news coverage indicating a 
passive and ineffectual police 
force, the editorial boards of the 
four newspapers weighed in
on the appropriateness of police 
work during the riot.
Each acknowledged that police 
could have done more
to actively stop the violence and 
looting, and they agreed that 
firing on looters could have 
touched off, in the words
of the Inquirer,
‘a holocaust of death.’”
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“Property could have been protected, and looting prevented, if 
police had been on the scene earlier, in larger numbers, properly 
equipped, with an advance plan of action, and with leadership 
prepared to execute the plan.”48 The culmination of four days 
of opining about the police in the city, this editorial showed the 
paper had changed its view considerably from its initial positive 
evaluation of police work during the riot.
While the Bulletin editorial board’s tone never rivaled the 
Inquirer’s in intensity, the paper’s evaluation of police action during 
the riot was similarly disapproving. On August 31, it stated:
 Two great losses remain to be reckoned. . . . One lies in the 
visible breakdown of law-enforcement, which permitted the looting 
of some 220 stores under the very eyes of the police. The long-range 
effects of such a display of disrespect for the law can only be harmful 
in the extreme. . . . A second great loss, still to be counted, lies in the 
incalculable damage to the sustained effort in Philadelphia to create an 
understanding relationship between the races.49
  
The Bulletin’s ordering of the “two great losses” reflected its 
primary concern with perceptions of police inaction. However, 
the reference to the police department “permit[ting]” rioters to 
loot stores revealed more than the paper’s disapproval of the way 
police that exerted their authority. The Bulletin perceived police 
action to reflect a broader trend toward disrespect in the city, which 
wielded “long-range effects.” Cast in this way, the riot signaled 
short-term destruction and the potential for future disaster rooted 
in racial divisions. The paper’s tone may not have been as overtly 
aggressive as the Inquirer’s, but it left readers with a similar degree 
of uncertainty regarding the future safety of their city.
The Daily News remained considerably less outspoken about 
the riot, but one week following its end it printed a summary 
statement: “This newspaper believes the Police Department deserves 
the praise that has been heaped on it from many quarters for its 
conduct during the recent riot in North Philadelphia. Despite great 
provocation, police kept their heads and refrained from actions 
that could have precipitated a bloodbath.”50 In spite of the damages 
in the neighborhood, the work of police was ultimately worthy of 
praise and admiration. Unlike the other dailies, however, the Daily 
News debated whether hiring 1,000 additional policemen, which 
was proposed by Mayor Tate following the riot, was necessary. It 
conceded that, “additional manpower, available in a hurry, might 
have prevented some, if not all of the looting,” but the paper did 
not stand by the statement wholeheartedly. Concluding on a 
more pragmatic note, the editorial board stated, “The taxpayers of 
Philadelphia will want to be convinced that the additional police 
are really needed.”51 Thus, the Daily News was more apprehensive 
about weighing in on the necessity of more police than its 
counterparts.
Closest to the Daily News in its commentary, the Tribune was 
the only unwavering supporter of Commissioner Leary, Mayor 
Tate, and the Philadelphia Police Department. Its editorial, like 
those in the Bulletin and Inquirer, invoked “law and order” and the 
need for its maintenance. Unlike the dailies, however, the Tribune 
persisted in its praise of the police department’s restraint in dealing 
with the violence in North Philadelphia. There was a difference 
between advocating respect for law and order and supporting 
greater police power. This differential interpretation of “law 
and order” lay at the root of the variations in coverage between 
Philadelphia’s newspapers. Embedded within the phrase “law and 
order” used by the city’s dailies was a racial implication: the need to 
exert authority over the lawless black “hoodlums,” who disrupted 
order within the city. The Tribune did not dispute the need to keep 
the peace, yet greater police power, in its estimation, would only 
lead to greater divisiveness.
Less than two weeks after the riot, coverage subsided, and the editorial boards quieted. While the focus turned to how the city would cope with the financial burden of 
having to rebuild the North Philadelphia neighborhood where 
the damages had occurred, with occasional overtures to the so-
called “ringleaders” of the riot, the discussion surrounding the 
relationship between Philadelphia’s Police Advisory Board and the 
nature of police response to the outbreak of violence on Columbia 
Avenue had only just begun.  
The Police Advisory Board and the Police Department, from 
the former’s inception in 1958, had hardly maintained civil 
relations. The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) filed a petition for 
a preliminary injunction against the city and the Police Review 
Board in December 1959, about one year after Mayor Dilworth 
had established the advisory body, charging he lacked the power to 
establish such a board. The board received additional attention from 
organizations such as the Fraternal Order of Police because of the 
suspected impact the board would have upon police work. In 1962, 
the Pennsylvania Guardian, a pro-police publication, commented, 
“Why the FOP dislikes the PAB is easy to understand. The FOP is 
to policemen what the American Legion is to veterans. As such it’s 
big for law, order, and nightsticks. And anyone against nightsticks 
is against law, order, and the FOP.”52 The Guardian’s linkage of 
law, order, and police weapons highlighted precisely what police 
criticized the board for depriving policemen of in 1964: the ability 
to exert their authority.  
The argument that the Police Advisory Board kept officers 
from effectively carrying out the duties of police work was one of 
the two central arguments leveled against the board by political 
officials and law enforcement. The other dealt with police morale: 
the board was created as a punitive body that would highlight 
the weaknesses of the police department and thereby contribute 
negatively to the tenor of the police establishment. Statistics 
proved the contrary. Between October 1958 and August 1963, 
the Police Advisory Board received 411 complaints about police 
brutality, illegal arrest or search, harassment, and “other” offenses. 
Of these complaints, half were withdrawn, closed, settled without a 
hearing, or dismissed due to the non-appearance of a complainant. 
Suspensions or reprimands were recommended in only thirty-one 
of the cases.53  
Although the board seemed to reinforce the achievements 
rather than emphasize the flaws of the Philadelphia Police 
Department, the criticisms leveled against it did not dissipate. 
The FOP continued its quest to demonstrate and reflect upon 
the “failures” of the board, and the 1964 Columbia Avenue riot 
presented such an opportunity because the outbreak of violence in 
Philadelphia raised questions not only in Philadelphia but also in 
New York City, which was looking to Philadelphia as an exemplar. 
New York Police Commissioner Michael J. Murphy announced 
in October 1964, months after the Columbia Avenue riot, that 
“a board of second-guessers” would undermine police morale and 
discipline. He stated, “Weaken the police and you weaken the 
entire structure of government. Demoralize the police department 
and you destroy law and order.” A staunch critic of New York 
City’s board, he believed “false charges of police brutality often are 
used as an excuse for riots.”54 Evoking memories in the not-too- 
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distant past of Philadelphia’s riot and Harlem’s before it, which had 
begun in predominantly African-American neighborhoods where 
a seemingly minor disturbance sparked a melee, he argued police 
advisory boards kept police from actively doing their jobs.  
The conversation between leaders in Philadelphia and New York 
City continued in May 1965 when John Samuels of the New York 
Democratic Club asked Police Advisory Board Executive Director 
Mercer Tate if he believed the board lowered police morale. Tate’s 
response unsurprisingly was no. However, he conceded, “I think it 
is fair to say that policemen have been more careful in engaging in 
bodily contact in furtherance of their duties (and in exceeding their 
duties) as the result of the establishment 
and operation of our Board. This was, 
I think, particularly evident during 
the North Philadelphia racial riots last 
summer.”55 Such a comment, while 
meant to highlight the board’s positive 
impact upon the Philadelphia Police 
Department, played well into the hands 
of the board’s detractors. 
Several months after Mercer Tate’s 
exchange with Samuels, as the one-year 
anniversary of the Columbia Avenue 
riot approached, James Williams of 
Philadelphia’s Congress of Racial 
Equality wrote a letter to Mayor James 
Tate, expressing concern regarding 
North Philadelphia. Citing heightened 
racial tensions, he pleaded for Mayor 
Tate to recognize the true potential of the 
Police Advisory Board, which according 
to Williams, was an institution that “has 
not been given a chance or [the] support 
to really become an asset.” He attributed 
the board’s lack of success to “city 
officials’ reluctance to fight the bigots 
and the far right over the concept of such 
a Board.”56 Tate’s response on August 23, 
1965, reassured Williams that the Police 
Advisory Board had his support, which 
“has been consistent despite pressures by 
the Fraternal Order of Police and bigoted 
organizations like the John Birch Society 
to weaken or destroy it.”57 The Police 
Advisory Board, for local black leaders 
and the mayor, wielded the potential 
to ease racial tensions by fostering trust 
between the police and the African-
American community. 
Mayor Tate remained steadfast in his conviction that the board 
was a pivotal part of civilian oversight of the police department, 
although he increasingly became the voice of dissent as opponents 
of the board became more vocal in their critiques both inside 
the city as well as across the nation. The Town Crier, a monthly 
newsletter published by the Philadelphia Committee to Support 
Your Local Police, reported in January 1966 that “our nation’s 
chief law enforcement officer, J. Edgar Hoover has stated, ‘A Police 
Advisory Board constitutes a backward step in law enforcement.’”58 
Echoing Hoover’s critique, FOP President John J. Harrington took 
the claim one step further by bringing it back to Philadelphia. 
Despite his statement during the riots that he was “perfectly 
satisfied” with the ways the violence was handled,59 in October 
1966 he stated, “Ten square miles of businesses in Philadelphia 
were wiped out during the 1964 riots because that city had a 
civilian-staffed police complaint board.”60 The statement marked 
a staggering shift in content and tone from those during the riot, 
reflecting the increasing pressure by law and order advocates 
outside the city as well as in it.
Harrington’s controversial claim that the board caused the 
destruction of the North Philadelphia neighborhood spawned 
a variety of reactions and attempts to set the record straight. 
Maurice Fagan, the chairman of the Philadelphia Fellowship 
Commission, argued that Harrington’s 
statement was patently untrue. In a letter 
to Philadelphia Managing Director Fred 
Corleto, he wrote: “I spoke today with 
Howard Leary about the statement, and 
he says there is absolutely no foundation 
to it and under no circumstances, would 
he had tolerated any police officer 
refusing to do his duty for this or any 
other reason.”61 Board Executive Director 
Mercer Tate took on the mantle of 
refuting Harrington by writing a letter to 
the Philadelphia Inquirer, the newspaper 
which had first printed Harrington’s 
statement. He claimed:
The statement that ten square miles 
of businesses were wiped out in the 1964 
Philadelphia riots is untrue. The businesses 
which were damaged were isolated and 
such damage in no way occurred because of 
the existence of the Police Advisory Board. 
Police were neither “confused” nor “afraid to 
use nightsticks or blackjacks” nor were they 
promised by any city official that they would 
not be taken before the Police Advisory Board 
as a result of actions taken during the riot 
period.62
Tate’s attempt to make clear the real 
“effects” of the Police Advisory Board was 
evident. He argued that the board did 
not tie the hands of officers, and it did 
not cause police officers to be paralyzed 
in the line of duty.
Tate’s words did little good. By 
March 1967, the language of the 
board’s detractors had taken hold, and 
the executive order creating the Police 
Advisory Board was deemed in violation of Philadelphia’s Home 
Rule Charter.63 Consequently, the board was prohibited from 
listening to additional cases.64 In response, Mercer Tate wrote to 
the mayor, “I feel it is a great tragedy that your Police Advisory 
Board is languishing while police-community relations are rapidly 
worsening. This is a national problem.”65 And languish the board 
did, despite pleas from local news organizations, including the 
Bulletin, and Advisory Board advocates.66
On December 22, 1969, the Philadelphia Police Department 
received, in the words of Police Commissioner Rizzo, the greatest 
Christmas present it could have asked for: the Philadelphia Police 
Advisory Board was dissolved. Mayor Tate claimed the Police 
“Although the delegitimation 
of the rioters enabled news 
organizations to dismiss
the violence as unrelated to the 
efforts of civil rights leaders 
and, by extension, to racial 
strife, the marginalization 
of the rioters simultaneously 
reified the broader language 
used to describe a neighborhood 
known commonly
as ‘The Jungle.’ The ‘shouting, 
howling’ members of the North 
Philadelphia community 
described by news organizations 
were envisaged as part
of an unruly mob unaware
of its actions and in desperate 
need of policing.”
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Advisory Board “did not measure up to the Police Department’s 
own Board of Inquiry, and that, at best, its activities and 
procedures were negative.”67 A stunning pronouncement from one 
of the board’s most avid supporters throughout the 1960s, Mayor 
Tate’s press release revealed the extent to which the climate of the 
city had changed since the election of Cold War liberals Joseph 
Clark and Dilworth to the mayor’s office in the 1950s. A year and 
a half prior to Tate’s announcement of the board’s dissolution, 
President Johnson’s Kerner Commission provided hard evidence 
for the necessity of institutional infrastructures aimed at easing 
racial tensions in urban areas. The federal commission championed 
bodies such as police advisory boards as advocates of all people, 
black and white. Philadelphia, however, did not heed the words 
of the commission. Still reigning was the “bitter residue of fear” 
of cities dissolving into chaos at the hands of black radicals and 
of police unable to contain the violence, which was cited by the 
commission.68
News coverage of Philadelphia’s 1964 riots did not lead alone 
to the Police Advisory Board’s demise. As the debates surrounding 
the board’s viability reveal, pressures exerted from within as well as 
outside city limits by pro-law enforcement agencies were exerted on 
Mayor Tate, political officials, and the courts. Yet, news coverage 
of Philadelphia’s 1964 riot on Columbia Avenue, privileging the 
frames of marginalization and police paralysis, offered more than 
an interpretive lens through which to view the eruption of violence. 
In encouraging readers to understand the riot as a war between the 
city and black “hoodlums” whose disregard for law and order was 
enabled by an ill-equipped police department, news organizations 
provided a language that could be co-opted by political interests to 
advance the agenda of law and order conservatives. The simplicity 
of news frames enabled the circulating discourse to focus on police 
power rather than on the larger, structural problems confronting 
the predominantly black neighborhood, problems only alluded 
to briefly by Philadelphia’s black press. Emphasizing the rioters’ 
marginal status, news organizations characterized the young men 
and women of the community in which the riot broke out as 
outside any legitimate movement. They were “acting out” rather 
than exercising a legitimate grievance, according to the newspapers. 
Although the delegitimation of the rioters enabled news 
organizations to dismiss the violence as unrelated to the efforts 
of civil rights leaders and, by extension, to racial strife, the 
marginalization of the rioters simultaneously reified the broader 
language used to describe a neighborhood known commonly as 
“The Jungle.” The “shouting, howling” members of the North 
Philadelphia community described by news organizations were 
envisaged as part of an unruly mob unaware of its actions and in 
desperate need of policing. When police were needed in the case 
of the 1964 North Philadelphia riot, they held back, reluctant to 
use their weapons to restore order, and subsequently were cast as 
weak and ineffectual actors in stemming the violence. Agreeing to 
the substance but not the spirit of the Inquirer’s and the Bulletin’s 
coverage, the Tribune, and the Daily News to a lesser extent, 
remained the voices of dissent, praising police action during the riot. 
Like Mayor Tate, newspapers articulated concern that additional 
lives would have been lost in a neighborhood “bloodbath” if police 
used guns. Yet, the papers disagreed about alternatives.
When news coverage first emerged in the wake of the 
spontaneous violence that erupted on August 28, no mention was 
made of the potential impact of the Police Advisory Board upon 
police action. Within months, however, as debates surrounding the 
necessity of such advisory bodies flared not only in Philadelphia 
but also in New York City, coverage of Philadelphia’s riot seemed 
to provide much needed evidence for the Fraternal Order of 
Police and other board detractors that police power would be 
restrained when law enforcement was compelled to carefully 
consider the ramifications of its actions. Restraint, for the board’s 
opponents, signaled a weakness: deference to the rioters wreaking 
havoc in Philadelphia. Yet this restraint, which this study refers 
to as a frame of police paralysis, became evidence of not simply 
police reluctance to use force but of the liberal “permissiveness” 
against which a growing conservative movement was reacting.69 
Journalistic discourses were co-opted in the service of ends that 
news organizations had not anticipated.
Years after the riot on Columbia Avenue ended, the frames of marginalization and police paralysis had not disappeared. They served as potent reminders of what could happen if 
police decided to “stand by” while lawless black “hoodlums” ruled 
the streets. Although journalists had not covered the riots with the 
intention of shaping the board’s fate, the coverage was ultimately 
used for ends that they had not envisioned, bolstering the claims 
of law and order advocates. In the wake of rioting in Watts in Los 
Angeles in 1965, and in Detroit and Newark two summers later, 
where violence had begun under conditions mirroring those in 
North Philadelphia, the city stood at a crossroads. Philadelphia 
could either internalize the messages of the Kerner Commission, 
encouraging racial unity through institutional change, or yield 
to the pressure of conservatives. Choosing the latter course, 
Philadelphia embarked on a rightward political turn that deepened 
the existing racial schism as it sought to define itself against the 
lingering frames of marginalization and police paralysis. Thus, 
Philadelphia stayed the course that the Kerner Commission 
observed as defining urban America: “two societies, one black, one 
white—separate and unequal.”70  
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